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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
felonies and misdemeanors as a criterion in determining the officer's
right to use force in making an arrest. A more realistic approach
would restrict the use of deadly force to crimes which are of a violent
nature.24 Thus, an officer should be permitted to use his gun if necessary
to arrest a murderer, an armed robber, or the perpretrator of any other
such violent crime, but deadly force should be forbidden in the arrest of
an embezzler, an ordinary thief, or any other person who has committed
a non-dangerous type of felony or misdemeanor. The statute should
enumerate the type of violent crime which the legislature would consider
dangerous enough to warrant the use of deadly force if necessary to
bring the criminal to justice. The statute should be broad enough to
cover situations where the criminal is resisting arrest, or where he is
fleeing from the officer's custody either before or after arrest.
In situations where the officer suspects that a person has committed
a violent crime the nature of which the legislature has decided would
make him a particularly dangerous enemy to society he should be per-
mitted to use deadly force in an effort to make the arrest if he has met
certain requirements. These should be strict enough to prevent the
promiscuous use of deadly force by the officer in such a way as to harm
innocent persons, yet at the same time be broad enough to permit the
officer to cope with the motorized criminal suspect. A suggested list
of such requirements might include: first, knowledge on the part of
the arresting officer that a certain violent crime has been committed
or attempted; second, that he have an adequate description of the
criminal; third, that the person suspected fit such description; fourth,
that every effort be made to communicate to the suspect the fact that he
is being sought by an officer of the law; fifth, that deadly force be used
only when other means fail.
While the enactment of a statute containing the provisions suggested
would not serve to eliminate forever the use of deadly force by an officer
in situations where it is not warranted, it would serve the purpose of
acquainting the officer with the type of situation wherein he may use
his revolver, and of protecting him from criminal and civil prosecution
when he has used it in conformity with the statutory provisions. Indi-
rectly it would serve to give greater protection to our citizenry from
the unauthorized use of deadly force, for the state would be in a position
where it could more conscientiously prosecute any officer who used his
revolver in a manner contrary to law.
RUSSELL P. GREIEL
Conspiracy Prosecutions in the Federal Courts
The United States Supreme Court addressed two different aspects
of the crime of criminal conspiracy in the case of Krulewitch v. United
States, one dealing with the admissibility of declarations of co-conspira-
tors and the other concerned with the possibility of future action by
the Court to limit the applications of the crime itself.' The petitioner
was convicted2 of violation of two sections of the Ifann Act,3 and of
24 See discussions in Proceedings of the American Law Institute, vol. 9, p. 179
(1931).
1336 U.S. 440 (1949).
2 Conviction affirmed, 167 F (2nd) 943 (C.A. 2nd 1948). A prior conviction was
reversed on the grounds that it was error not to allow defendant 's counsel to inspect
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conspiracy to violate a federal statute.4 He appealed on the grounds
that he had been prejudiced on trial by the admission into evidence of
certain testimony of the complaining witness, who was allegedly induced
by petitioner and his co-conspirator to travel interstate for the purpose
of prostitution.
The questioned testimony concerned a conversation between the
complaining witness and the petitioner's co-conspirator more than a
month and a half after the illicit travel had occurred, and after the
complaining witness had returned alone. 5 All three had been under
arrest at the time the conversation was alleged to have occurred, charged
with the offense of which the co-conspirators were later convicted. 6
From the facts, there was no doubt that the conspiracy to violate the
Mann Act had ended and that the conversation was not in further-
ance of that conspiracy. The government, acknowledging this, argued
that the conversation was nevertheless admissible as in furtherance of
a subsidiary object of the Mann Act conspiracy, an implied conspiracy to
conceal the facts of the crime in order to prevent conviction.
7
The Supreme Court denied the implied conspiracy theory and reversed
the conviction.8 The opinion of the Court9 reiterated the strict observ-
ance by the federal courts of the rule that, in order to be admissible as
an exception to the hearsay rule, unsworn, out-of-court declarations of co-
conspirators must be made in furtherance of and during the charged
conspiracy. What may be a satisfying trend toward the limitation of the
use of conspiracy indictments is noticeable in the concurring opinion of
which more will be said later.
The case of Logan v. United States established the declarations rule in
the law of criminal conspiracy. 10 The basis for the rule is to be found
however in an agency case where Mr. Justice Story commented upon
the admissibility of declarations of a known agent which tended to prove
the involvement of the principal in the offense charged, and ruled that
a written statement made by complaining witness for the purpose of impeachment.
3 36 Stat. 825 (1910), 18 U.S.C.A. §§398, 399.
435 Stat. 1096 (1909), 18 U.S.C.A. §88.
5 In substance, the conversation was an admission of guilt by the co-conspirator
which strongly implicated petitioner; the complaining witness was admonished by
the co-conspirator not to "talk" until a lawyer was procured, and that it would
be better for the two of them to take the blame rather than petitioner.
6 A Florida grand jury failed to indict, although petitioner and his alleged co-
conspirator had been arrested there.
7 The circuit court in sustaining the conviction adopted the government's theory:
"We think that implicit in a conspiracy to violate the law is an agreement among
the conspirators to conceal the violation after as well as before the illegal plan is
consummated. Thus, the conspiracy continues at least for purposes of conceal-
ment . . . 167 F. (2nd) 943, 946. The government s implied conspiracy theory
is not new. The same contention was made and refused in Logan v. United States,
144 U.S. 263 (1892) (petitioners were convicted of murder in course of a plan to
secure the release of a criminal in the hands of federal authorities; evidence of a
plan to conceal one of the petitioners after failure of the conspiracy was held in-
admissible as not included among the original and charged conspiracy.) Cf. Murray
v. United States, 10 F. (2nd) 409 (C.A. 7th 1926); McDonald v. United States, 89
F. (2nd) 128 (C.A. 8th 1937).
s Accord: Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissent-
ing, indicates that conviction of petitioner of substantive crime when only evidence
of guilt showed guilt of conspiracy to commit the substantive crime was equivalent
to implying a crime, contrary to the Constitution.)
9 Mr. Justice Burton dissented on grounds that the admission of the conversation
was harmless error.
10144 U.S. 263 (1892).
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the declarations were admissible if made during and in furtherance of
the agency relationship. 1" In dictum, this rule was applied to the case
of conspiracy. 12 This dictum was the authority for the holding in the
Logan case. 13 It would seem then that the declarations rule is not so
much an exception to the hearsay rule, but rather it is the result of a
peculiar characteristic of the crime of conspiracy which holds all the
conspirators as agents and principals of one another within the scope of
the conspiratorial relationship.'
4
The declarations rule is composed of dual phases. Declarations are
inadmissible if not made in furtherance of the congpiracy, even though
made within its duration.' 5 The converse is true that declarations made
in furtherance yet not within the duration of the conspiracy are also
inadmissible. 16 If the declarations are alleged inadmissible as not in
furtherance of the conspiracy, the determining issue is the common pur-
pose and aim of the conspiracy, on which the facts of each case are
controlling. If inadmissibility is predicated upon the declarations not
being made during the conspiracy, the issue is the length of existence
of the conspiracy. The federal courts have generally adopted the rule
that a conspiracy lasts until the common purpose or aim is attained or
lost.17 There are many cases in which both phases of the rule are ap-
plicable.' 8  Illustrative of this group are cases where the declarations
questioned were made to officers following arrest of the co-conspirator.
Such declarations are generally held inadmissible both as not in further-
ance and not during the conspiracy. 19 The instant case may be distin-
guished from these cases since, although made following arrest, the
declarations were not made to public officials. Nevertheless, it would
seem that dual grounds for exclusion exist since the declarations, clearly
not in furtherance of the conspiracy charged, were made, or so the
instant decision held, after the termination of that conspiracy.
An evaluation of the declarations rule is difficult. It has become so
11 United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. 460 (1827) (declarations of agent within
the scope of authority held admissible against his principal on trial for violation of
a federal statute.)
12 25 U.S. 460, 469.
13 144 U.S. 263, 309.
14 Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917); 4 Wigmore on
Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §1079. As Judge Hand said: "When men enter into an
agreement for an unlawful end, they become ad hoc agents for one another. What
one does pursuant to their common purpose, all do, and as declarations may be such
acts, they are competent against all." Van Riper v. United States, 13 F. (2nd) 961,
967 (C.A. 2nd 1926).
15 Fiswick v. United StateS, 329 U.S. 211 (1946) (although the results of the con-
spiracy, concealment of membership in the Nazi Party, were continuing, the con-
spiracy itself was not, the last overt act marking its end.); Holt v. United States,
94 F. (2nd) 90 (C.A. 10th 1937); Mayola v. United States, 71 F. (2nd) 65 (C.A.
9th 1934).
16 Gambino v. United States, 108 F. (2nd) 140 (C.A. 3rd 1939); Link v. United
States, 30 F. (2nd) 342 (C.A. 8th 1929); of. Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156
U.S. 51 (1885).
l7McDonald v. United States, 89 F. (2nd) 128 (C.A. 8th 1937).
I Eg. Brown v. United States, 150 U.S. 93 (1893) (declaration in question was
made after the conspiracy had been abandoned, and in furtherance of concealment
of a fellow conspirator who had killed a government marshal, which murder was not
the object of the original conspiracy.)
19 Graham v. United States, 15 F. (2nd) 740 (C.A. 8th 1926); Corso v. United
States, 100 F. (2nd) 604 (C.A. 7th 1939); Lonardo v. United States, 67 F. (2nd)




ingrained in the federal court decisions that its efficacy is not ques-
tioned.20 Under its operation, as in the instant case, a witness may
testify to unsworn, out-of-court statements made by an alleged co-con-
spirator who is absent from the trial, hence incriminating the defendant
with hearsay evidence. But more important than the apparent value of
the rule as a means of increasing the permissible scope of the prosecu-
tor's evidence, there would seem to be confusion in the federal courts as
to the place of the declarations of co-conspirators in proving the con-
spiracy. This confusion stems from the present situation in the federal
courts with regard to the establishment of the guilt of an alleged
conspirator.
Proof of guilt of an alleged conspirator logically requires a showing
of a conspiracy, and then the connection of the alleged conspirator there-
with. There is no settled evidentiary criteria in the federal courts on
which the conspirational relationship may be established.21 Proof of
the relationship under the conspiracy statute would seem to require the
showing of an agreement, the criminal intent to violate a federal statute,
and an overt act in furtherance of the agreement. 22 It is well settled
that circumstantial evidence may properly establish the relationship, 28
but the different evidentiary criteria noticeable in the federal decisions
cause the declarations of co-conspirators to assume varying degrees of
importance in the proving of the conspiratorial relationship. In some
cases for example, the declarations have no place in the establishment of
the relationship.24 In others, the declarations may be admissible to indi-
cate the criminal intent with which the agreement was entered into,25
and a few decisions find them used to establish the agreement as well
as the intent.
26
Guilt, however, requires the showing of the connection of the alleged
conspirator with the relationship. It is generally accepted that the
declarations of co-conspirators are not in themselves enough to implicate
20 Mr. Justice Black, for the majority in the instant case, feels that there are
"cogent" reasons that may be advanced against the rule, but feeling bound by
precedent accepts it, giving no clue as to what the reasons are. 336 U.S. 440, 443.
21 See Cousens, Agreement as an Element in Conspiracy (1937) 23 Virginia L.
Rev. 898.
222 Zolline, Federal Criminal Law and Procedure (1921) 286, 302; and see
United States v. Cohen, 145 F. (2nd) 82 (C.A. 2nd 1944), Noted (1944) 58 Har.
L. Rev. 279 (held: the overt act is an evidentiary condition of prosecution, and not
an element of the crime) ; accord: Holmes, J., dissenting in Hyde v. United States,
225 U.S. 347 (1912) (venue of conspiracy may be placed where conspiracy is
entered into, or may be at the place where overt act was performed.).
23 Williams v. United States, 3 F. (2nd) 933 (C.A. 6th 1925) ; Nat'l Ben Franklin
Fire Ins. Co. v. Stuckey, 79 F. (2nd) 631 (C.A. 5th 1935); Galatas v. United States,
80 F. (2nd) 15 (C.A. 8th 1935); see Richie, The Crime of Conspiracy (1938) 16
Canadien B. Rev. 202.
24 Winchester & Partridge Mfg. Co. v. Cleary, 116 U.S. 161 (1885) (declaration
as evidence of conspiracy to sell assets of insolvent debtors held inadmissible without
prior establishment of the conspiratorial relationship by independent evidence);
Davidson v. United States, 61 F. (2nd) 250 (C.A. 8th 1932) ; Nibbelnick v. United
States, 66 F. (2nd) 178 (C.A. 6th 1933).
25 Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 658 (1896) (conspiracy to aid military
expedition against the Spanish in Cuba); Hitelunan Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell,
245 U.S. 229 (1917); United States v. Vehicular Parking, 52 F. Supp. 751 (D.C.
Dela. 1943); of. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946).
26 Smith v. United States, 284 Fed. 673 (C.A. 8th 1922); Connecticut Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 188 U.S. 208 (1903); cf. Cummings v. United States, 15




an otherwise unconnected defendant.27 Even here there is possibility
of misuse of the declarations of co-conspirators in those cases where the
practical effect of the admission of the declarations is the implication of
the otherwise unimplicated defendant, since few juries can be expected to
accept such testimony as applying only to those defendants already im-
plicated by other evidence. 28 It has been held that "but slight evidence"
will implicate a defendant in the conspiratorial relationship, 29 as will
participation in the substantive offense or overt act, although not knowing
of the conspiratorial relationship itself.8 0 Hence, the value of this rule
which permits the admission of the declarations of alleged co-conspirators
would seem to decrease as more weight is given the declarations to
establish the conspiratorial relationship, because of the likelihood of mis-
application among defendants by the jury, and the existence of too slight
requirements for establishment of the connection between the alleged
conspirator and the relationship.
The present use of the declarations rule illustrates a common situation
in the conspiracy field today, namely the subordination of the individual
safeguards in our concept of criminal justice to that which the federal
courts, in their interpretation of the conspiracy statute,31 apparently
believe to be a more desirable object, expedient and efficient protection
of society from the danger of group planning in crime.3 2 While protec-
tion of society from such a threat is proper and commendable, the possi-
bility of undue prosecutor advantage ought not to be overlooked.
33
The concurring opinion of M-fr. Justice Jackson is concerned with the
possibility of such an advantage.3 4 Where the majority of the Court
discusses the threatened expansion of the declarations rule by means of
the government's implied conspiracy theory, Justice Jackson uses
the instant case as an excuse to deliver a strong protest against loose
practice in the employment of conspiracy indictments.3 5 Many reasons
are suggested why indiscriminate indictment for conspiracy "constitutes
27 Mayola v. United States, 71 F. (2nd) 65 (C.A. 9th 1934) ; Nibbelnick v. United
States, 66 F. (2nd) 178 (C.A. 6th 1933); Hauger v. United States, 173 Fed. 54
(C.A. 4th 1909). Contra: Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 658 (1896).
28 See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947) for illustration of the
possibility of incorrect application of evidence among co-defendants by the jury.
29 Galatas v. United States, 80 F. (2nd) 15 (C.A. 8th 1935), cert. denied 297
U.S. 711 (1935); Note (1936) 27 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 128; Roberts v. United
States, 248 Fed. 873 (C.A. 9th 1918); Meyers v. United States, 94 F. (2nd) 433
(C.A. 6th 1938).
30 Wilkerson v. United States, 41 F. (2nd) 654 (C.A. 7th 1930) ; Stack v. United
States, 27 F. (2nd) 16 (C.A. 9th 1928). Contra: Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S.
632 (1896); Lee v. United States, 106 F. (2nd) 906 (C.A. 9th 1939) ; Davidson v.
United States, 61 F. (2nd) 250 (C.A. 8th 1932); of. McDonnell v. United States,
19 F. (2nd) 80 (C.A. 1st 1927).
31 62 Stat. 862, 18 U.S.C.A. §371 (1948).
32 See Note (1949) 62 Har. L. Rev. 276.
33 Possibilities of abuse in conspiracy field have been noted by the Supreme Court:
Recommendations of the Senior Circuit Judges, Rep. Att'y. Gen. (1925) 5; Brown
v. Elliot, 225 U.S. 392, 400 (1911); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
See Von Moltkev v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 727 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
34 With Justices Frankfurter and Murphy.
35 For the general rule of the requirements necessary to sustain a conspiracy
indictment under the late federal conspiracy statute, cited supra note 4, see Rudner
v. United States, 281 Fed. 516, 518 (C.A. 6th 1922) (indictment is sufficient if it
"follows the language of the statute and contains a sufficient statement of an
overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy."). Accord: Rose v. United States,
149 F. (2nd) 755 (C.A. 9th 1945).
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a serious threat to fairness in our administration of justice." 3 6 The
vagueness and pliability of the conspiratorial concept has led to its
expansion, not only in the lower federal courts, but in the Supreme
Court as well.3 7 The peculiar Anglo-American doctrine which attributes
criminality to a combination which contemplates no act which would be
criminal if carried out by any one of the combiners has also broadened
the concept into a weapon to secure economic ends.3 8 This broadening,
coupled with the use of conspiracy in civil proceedings where more lax
practices are sanctioned, has led to the importation into proceedings
under the federal conspiracy statute of legal processes originally con-
ceived for other purposes, which work to the disadvantage of the de-
fendant in a conspiracy trial.39 Furthermore, a conspiracy conviction
may increase the degree of penalty over that levied for unconcerted
offending.40 And procedural advantages accruing to the prosecution
from a conspiracy charge add to the danger of indiscriminate extension
of the concept.
41
Against this background, one sentence of the concurring opinion merits
particular thought :42
36 336 U.S. 440, 446.
37 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (conviction on substantive
charge where there was no proof of participation in or knowledge of the crime
upon the theory that conspiracy is equivalent to aiding and abetting.). Cf. Nye &
Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949) (where the Court comments on the
Pinkerton case, and apparently narrows its holding.).
58 See Cousens, supra note 21. He suggests that the federal courts have relied
upon conspiracy under the desire to expand the criminal jurisdiction of the United
States to meet modem necessities. Compare the application of conspiracy under
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
39See United States v. Cohen, 145 F. (2nd) 82 (C.A. 2nd 1944) (in discussing
the difference in proof necessary in criminal conspiracy cases as distinguished from
civil, the court concludes that there is none.).
40 Under the late conspiracy statute, cited supra note 4, a joint misdemeanor
could be shifted into a felony by reliance on a conspiracy count; an incompleted
plan carried a greater degree of penalty than the successful plan. Eg., Weiss v.
United States, 103 F. (2nd) 759 (C.A. 3rd 1939). The new conspiracy statute
cited supra note 31, remedies this situation, but nevertheless, where the penalty for
the substantive crime is less than five years maximum imprisonment, employment
of a conspiracy charge, punishment for which is now a maximum of five years, may
yet result in the infliction of greater punishment for unsuccessful planning.
41Procedural advantages accruing from a conspiracy indictment are: (a) the
declarations rule; (b) the difficulty of controlling the order of proof, which allows
the prosecution much leeway (e.g. see extract from the trial of People v. Hines,
reprinted in Michael & Wechsler, Criminal Law and its Administration (1940) 673);
(c) possibility of guilt by association due to jury prejudice (see Blumenthal v.
United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947)); (d) the confused situation regarding the
extent to which the elements of a conspiracy must be shown before guilt may be
established (premature and unwarranted establishment of a conspiracy may well
be a source of prejudice against a defendant in the jury's consideration of his
substantive guilt); (e) possibility of mass trials. See Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750, 756 (1946) (petitioner and 31 others were charged with one con-
spiracy, the proof actually showing eight separate conspiracies; Rutledge, J.,
addressed the source of burden to defendants of mass trials.). Bringing all the
likely defendants together in one trial rather than separate trials allows the prose-
cution to put the maximum proof before the court, to circumvent the statute of
limitations as to some of the overt acts, and to prove the conspiratorial relationship
only once, Michael & Wechsler, Criminal Law and its Administration (1940) 657,
citing 15 Scraps 22-23 (1939) (official publication of the Office of the U. S. Attorney,
Southern District of New York.). See also, comments of Hand, J., in United States
v. Falcone, 109 F. (2nd) 579, 581 (C.A. 2nd 1940).
42 336 U.S. 440, 457.
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""There should be no straining to uphold any conspiracy conviction
where prosecution for the substantive offense is adequate and the
purpose served by adding the conspiracy charge seems chiefly to get
procedural advantages to ease the way to conviction."
Such a use of the conspiratorial concept strikes Justice Jackson as unfair.
He does not intend to question that the basic concept has a place in mod-
ern criminal law, since protection must be had against proposed group
criminality due to the seriousness of group crimes. Nor does he think
that the solution, as suggested by others, lies in the clarification of evi-
dentiary criteria of the concept.43 But rather there must be a discrimi-
nate and fair employment of the conspiracy indictment to insure justice
for the individual, as well as to secure protection for society.
There are three different practices in the use of conspiracy indictments
which have been cited as sources of possible abuse to the defendant:
indictment only for conspiracy in lieu of a substantive crime,44 indict-
ment for conspiracy after conviction on the substantive charge,4 5 and
indictment for conspiracy in addition to indictment for the substantive
charge itself.
4 6
It would appear that the first two sources of abuse are not of the same
nature as the third, to which Justice Jackson directs his criticism. In
neither of the first two practices ought the conspiracy charge unduly
burden an innocent defendant. Under the federal law, conspiracy is a
separate and distinct offense from the substantive crime which is the
object of the conspiracy.47 In view of this, it is difficult to see how a legal
argument can be advanced to disqualify such practices. The defendant
is only subject to the rigors of the crime of conspiracy itself; in any case
where the indictment is solely for conspiracy, the possible abuses inherent
43 Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy (1940) 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 642; Cousens,
cited supra note 21, where the author calls for the exercise of "certiorari power"
of the Supreme Court to clarify the present confusion regarding the requirements
as to the agreement element in the law of criminal conspiracy.
44 United States v. Kissel, 173 Fed. 823 (C.A. 2nd 1909) (Holt, J., indicates two
reasons for employment of conspiracy indictments in lieu of a substantive charge:
advantages to be gained in a long statute of limitations and in applicable rules of
evidence.); Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 (1913) (Holmes, J., comments on
the possibility of abuse to defendants in such use of conspiracy indictments.). See
Regina v. Boulton, 12 Cox Cr. Cas. 87 (1871) (criticism is directed at indictment
for conspiracy alone when the only evidence to establish the conspiracy would be
proof of the substantive crime itself.).
45 Westfall v. United States, 20 F. (2nd) 604 (C.A. 6th 1927) (here the court
feels that, due to the separability of conspiracy and the substantive offense under
the federal law, remedy for this abuse must be found in legislation precluding
indictment for conspiracy to commit a crime for which the defendant has already
been convicted.).
46 It is to this employment of conspiracy indictments that the criticism of the
Senior Circuit Judges would also appear to be directed, cited supra note 33. In
those cases where the gist of the substantive crime requires acts which would other-
wise be equivalent to conspiracy, indictment for both the substantive offense and
conspiracy to commit it has been questioned on double jeopardy grounds, Brady v.
United States, 24 F. (2nd) 399 (C.A. 8th 1928); contra: Sealfon v. United States,
332 U.S. 575 (1948), noted (1948) 39 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 58 (double
jeopardy not applicable where a prior acquittal on a conspiracy charge is raised
in bar to further prosecution on a charge of aiding and abetting, due to statutory
distinction between conspiracy and the substantive offense.); and on grounds of
res adjudicata, see United States v. DeAngelo, 138 F. (2nd) 466 (C.A. 3rd 1943);
cf. United States v. Morse, 24 F. (2nd) 1001 (S.D. N.Y. 1926).
47 Rabinowich v. United States, 238 U.S. 78 (1915); Heike v. United States, 227
U.S. 131 (1913).
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in a conspiracy charge are at least kept within the scope of that charge
alone. Justice Jackson's criticism would seem to be directed at the prac-
tice, the result of which is the possible overflow of those abuses into a trial
on the substantive charge, easing the path to conviction, and, in 'any
event, working in an unfair advantage on the defendant. In those cases
where the conspiracy count is added solely to secure that advantage, he
suggests that a reviewing court ought not "strain" to uphold conviction.
Whether or not Justice Jackson was thinking specifically of the appli-
cation of the Supreme Court's supervisory power over the lower federal
courts so as to insure that such conviction would not be sustained only
speculation is possible. But it would seem that such an interpretation
of the concurring opinion is not unreasonable. In the case of McNabb v.
United States,48 the Supreme Court endeavored through its supervisory
power over the federal courts to remedy what it considered another unfair
practice, the admission of confessions secured by enforcement officers
during a period of wilful delay in arraignment before a judicial officer
for the determination of the sufficiency of cause for detention. Convic-
tions for murder of a federal officer were reversed on the ground that
the confessions on which the convictions were dependent were attained
after hours of continuous questioning without opportunity given the
petitioners to inquire into their arrest. "Secret interrogation of persons
accused of crimes" struck the Court as so unfair that it insisted that
the procedural requirement of arraignment take on an importance
amounting almost to a substantive "right" of arrested persons. Hence,
evidence obtained at the expense of that "right" may not be admitted,
and the prior criterion of the sufficiency of a confession, the voluntary-
trustworthy test, was overlooked in favor of a more "civilized"
standard.
49
There are in the conspiracy indictment situation certain elements
which indicate a possible parallel with the exercise of federal supervisory
power in the McNabb case. There, the Court attempted to remedy a prac-
tice in law enforcement not prevented by the due process clause, but
which nevertheless was unfair to arrested persons.50 The main objection
to the use of conspiracy indictments in addition to substantive charges
where such indictments are added by the prosecution only to secure
procedural advantages is not a due process argument either, but one
going to the unfairness of the practice. In both cases, the unfairness
comes about primarily as a result of acts by federal officers.5 1 In addition
48 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
49 See Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896) (application of the voluntary-
trustworthy test).
50 "Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of pro-
cedure and evidence. Such standards are not satisfied merely by observance of those
minimal historic safeguards . . . which are summarized as 'due process of law'."
Per Frankfurter, J., in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
51 It would seem that the federal district attorney exercises great control over
the federal grand jury as regards what prosecutions are commenced. One reason is
that the presentment, or notice of any offense given by the grand jury itself from
its own knowledge without the aid of information or indictment, is not now used
in the federal courts because of the availability of federal attorneys to assist the
grand jury and because of the decline of prosecution by private individuals,
Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal (1947) 158. Grand juries have
been called the "rubber stamp" of prosecutors; see Morse, A Survey of the Grand
Jury System (1931) 10 Oregon L. Rev. 295, 304; Miller, Information or Indict-
ment in Felony Cases (1924) 8 Minn. L. Rev. 379, 397. Cf. Illinois Crime Survey
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